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Fritz F. Heimannt
The New Industrial State is an extraordinarily stimulating workboth when one agrees and when one disagrees with Professor Galbraith's
conclusions. It is stimulating because of the range and importance of
the issues with which it deals, because of its many fresh insights, and
because of the wit and urbanity of its prose. Professor Galbraith's principal focus is on "the industrial system," the sphere of the large corporations. He examines their internal processes (how are decisions made
and what are the goals and motivations) and their principal external
relationships (customers and markets, the federal government, the
financial community, the unions, and the educational world).
The New Industrial State deals with most of the major economic
issues: the role of the antitrust laws, the effects of technology, the control of inflation and of unemployment, and the role of advertising.
Galbraith portrays modem economic life as a whole and shows the
close interrelationships of the changes taking place in various parts of
the economy and its institutions. Moreover, his concluding chapters
range far beyond economics and deal with political and philosophical
questions: the effect of the industrial system on the values and priorities of American society, and the possible ways to obtain a higher
priority for noneconomic values. Professor Galbraith has illuminating
observations about almost every subject, and controversial ones about
many. The New Industrial State is a major work which is likely to
have substantial impact on economic thinking and on public policy.
This review is divided into two parts. The first will summarize Galbraith's principal themes. The second will comment on several of these
in some detail. In fairness to the reader it should be stated at the outset
that the reviewer is a corporation lawyer associated with a large corporation, which is referred to with some frequency in the course of the
book." In Galbraith's view, lawyers, and particularly corporation lawyers, are expected to be encumbered by a professional parochialism
-t Fritz F. Heimann, a member of the New York and District of Columbia Bars, is Associate Corporate Counsel for The General Electric Company.
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which may be almost as bad as that which he ascribes to his fellow
economists.
I.

GALBRAITH'S INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM

The basic thesis of The New Industrial State is that the complexity
of modem technology, and the comprehensive planning which is required for its application, explain both the nature and the behavior
of the large corporations which dominate the modern industrial system.
Corporations must be very large to provide the aggregations of
specialized manpower, facilities, and capital required for the application of increasingly intricate technology. The complexity of the technology imposes lengthy lead times from the initiation of a project
until a product can be marketed. This in turn calls for comprehensive
planning both on the production side and on the marketing side. "Planning" to Galbraith means freeing the corporation as much as possible
from the uncertainties of the market. It means securing control over
essential sources of supply and other production requirements. It also
means securing control over demand and over prices.
He argues that the "management of demand" is made possible because the industrial system has made our society affluent. In the affluent
society consumer demand is no longer dictated primarily by direct
physical needs. An increasingly large percentage of consumer expenditures are in response to psychological desires such as pleasure and
status. As a result, Galbraith argues, consumer demand becomes readily manageable through advertising.
Prices must be controlled because sharp price fluctuations would
disrupt the comprehensive planning process which modern technology
requires. In Galbraith's words:
The industrial system provides the price control that it requires as an effortless consequence of its own development.
Modern industrial planning requires and rewards great size.
This means that a comparatively small number of large firms
will share the typical market. Each will act with full consideration of its own needs and of the common need. Each
must have control of its own prices and will recognize this to
be the common requirement. Each will forswear any action,
and notably any sanguinary price-cutting, which would be
prejudicial to the common interest in price control. This
control is not something that must be contrived. Nor, except
in a few peculiarly complex cases, is it very difficult to susm2
tain.
2 P. 190.
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Consistent with this analysis, Galbraith regards the antitrust laws as an
anachronism.
The impact of technology and the resulting need for complex planning have reshaped the internal decision-making process of the large
corporation. Important decisions usually require a broad range of
highly specialized inputs from experts in many technical and managerial disciplines. Inevitably, a large number of people become involved in the decision-making process. Galbraith coins the word "technostructure" to describe this group. While the term has an unfelicitous
Germanic sound, it aptly conveys the difference from the traditional
concept of "management." Instead of being the exclusive prerogative
of a small group of top level managers, the decision-making process
requires the active collaboration of a large number of managers and
individual specialists at many levels within the organization structure.
With the broad diffusion of decision-making authority there has developed a far greater basis for "identification" by the participants with
the corporation and its objectives. This contrasts with the old-fashioned
"entrepreneurial" corporation where a sharp separation existed between the ownership group, which ran the corporation for its own
profit, and the managers and other employees who executed the orders
of the owners. The ability of a large number of employees to "identify"
with the corporation has important ramifications. Galbraith suggests
that the lack of union success in organizing engineers and other technical personnel is explained by the fact that they have developed a
strong identification with the corporation. Even with production
workers, the position of the unions has been weakened by the takeover
of the technostructure. The disappearance of the old fashioned "bosses"
has tended to blunt the emotional edges of labor controversy.
The dominant objectives of the technostructure of the large corporation are, first, to protect its own autonomy from outside interference,
and, second, to achieve rapid growth. The maximizing of profits is no
longer the all-pervasive objective which it was in the days when the
managers of the corporation were also the recipients of its profits.
Profits are still important because failure to make adequate profits will
result in pressure from directors, and complaints from stockholders.
Inadequate profits will also limit the ability to grow without resort to
outside financing. Thus, if profits dip too low, serious threats of outside interference may result. Galbraith argues that, as long as profits are
sufficient to forestall outside interference, they become a secondary
objective. A corporation with a reasonably satisfactory rate of profit is
likely to be more interested in increased growth than in maximizing
profits. Growth becomes the dominant objective because it will result
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in increased responsibilities, salary raises, and promotions for the individuals who make up the technostructure.
Technical innovation is also an important objective. It is closely
associated with growth and is of great personal interest to the scientists
and engineers who make up a high percentage of the technostructure.
However, technical innovation can be a goal only as long as it does not
prejudice a minimum level of earnings. Galbraith observes that, given
the costs and uncertainties associated with research and development,
this can easily happen.
Professor Galbraith argues forcefully for the importance of the
autonomy of the corporate decision-making process. In view of the
complexities of the planning process, decisions must be based on the
knowledge and experience which exists only within the technostructure. The decision-making process will not operate efficiently if it is
subjected to outside interference, whether by stockholders, by financial
institutions, by government agencies, or by unions. Furthermore, such
interference will affect the morale of the technostructure and impair
the enthusiasm with which decisions are carried out. Galbraith comments that the vigor with which the technostructure defends its autonomy is justified.
Some of the same factors which have made the technostructure supreme in the American corporation are at work in socialist economies.
The complexities of technology and of the planning process make it
desirable that the technostructure of state-owned enterprises control
the decision-making process. Galbraith points out that in those countries where such control has not been given, the results have been
uniformly dismal. The trend toward decentralization in Russia and
other Eastern European economies reflects in Galbraith's view not a
"return to the market" but a recognition that effective decision-making must be exercised by the technostructure of the particular enterprise, rather than by a centralized state planning agency.
Galbraith observes that the takeover of the technostructure undercuts the fundamental rationale on which socialist doctrine is based. A
change from ownership by private stockholders to ownership by the
state does not significantly affect the power of the technostructure.
There is considerable distress among socialists over how little nationalization of an industry means. Effective public control is simply not
practical. Citing the British experience, he notes, "Socialism has come
to mean government by socialists who have learned that socialism, as
anciently understood, is impractical."3
3

P. 101.
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The influence of the bankers in the American industrial system is
much reduced from the traditional power of Wall Street because of the
takeover of the technostructure and because modern corporations are
able to finance their growth largely through retained earnings. Galbraith regards this as one of the key developments. In effect, the
"capitalist" has been displaced from the pivotal position of power
which he traditionally occupied. This has important implications not
only in terms of who runs the corporation, but also on the goals for
which it is managed. For example, Galbraith suggests that the emphasis
on growth, rather than on profits, reflects the shift of power from the
suppliers of capital to the technostructure.
Galbraith also stresses the change in the relation between the corporation and the state. He contends that the traditional dividing line between "public" and "private" activities has been substantially eroded.
Particularly in areas involving high technological content, the activities
of the federal government and of private corporations are inextricably
intertwined. In addition, the industrial system looks to the state for a
broad range of actions to stabilize and to expand the economy, and to
assure a supply of properly educated, and particularly technically
trained, personnel.
In Galbraith's view the relation between the state and the modem
corporation is based on common objectives. The state is strongly concerned with the stability of the economy, with expansion and growth,
with technical and scientific progress, with education, and, of course,
with national defense. Galbraith notes that all of these goals correspond
to needs of the technostructure of the large corporation.
Galbraith maintains that the influence of the corporations on the
state is enormous. He explains that this influence is not at all sinister.
It reflects the fact that both are working together for the same objectives. Looking for the little man with the black bag, or for more
sophisticated influence peddlers, is a pointless exercise. The modem
corporation has neither the ability nor the incentives to use crude
methods for influencing government actions. Important government
decisions are generally made by large numbers of people working
within the technostructure of government agencies. Because of the
large number of people involved, such decisions simply cannot be
"bought." However, through the perfectly legitimate day-to-day interaction of countless representatives of the industrial system with their
opposite numbers in the federal bureaucracy, great influence is exerted.
Galbraith observes that this interaction is a two-way street, and that the
government is in a position to exercise great influence on business.
The first three hundred pages of The New Industrial State are pri-
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marily devoted to understanding how the industrial system functions.
Implicit and frequently explicit is a highly favorable judgment of the
economic performance of the industrial system. In his final chapters
Professor Galbraith discusses what he considers its shortcomings. These,
he argues, stem in large measure from its success.
The achievements of the industrial system in the production of
goods and in technological progress have shaped the values of American society. This has resulted in the assignment of excessively high
priorities to the values at which the industrial system excels, and a
slighting of those values which are inconsistent with or unimportant
for the goals of the industrial system. In sum, materialistic concerns
have taken precedence over esthetic and other noneconomic values.
Pollution of air and water, urban decay, lack of highway safety, and
failure to preserve natural beauty are among the examples cited by
Galbraith where the priorities of the industrial system have overridden
other concerns.
Galbraith criticises the reluctance to take public action in those
fields where the industrial system has not operated effectively. He mentions urban and suburban transportation, urban housing, community
planning, and development of parks and other outdoor recreational
facilities. He also expresses concern over the concentration of the industrial system on the technology associated with the cold war.
The pressures which the industrial system places on the individual,
most notably pressures for conformity with the requirements of large
organizations, represent another major area of concern. However, Galbraith ends on a generally optimistic note. The industrial system's
requirement of greater education has brought with it the rapid
growth of what Galbraith terms the "scientific and educational estate."
This group should be able to develop an increasing measure of independence from the power of the industrial system. He expects the
scientific and educational estate to become an effective political force
which will provide some countervailing power to the pressures of the
industrial system. This, he argues, should lead to the assignment of
higher priorities to those programs and values which the industrial
system either downgrades or does not perform effectively.
II.

SOME COMMENTS, QUALIFICATIONS, AND DISSENTS

The New Industrial State presents an enormous range of ideas, and
a review can hardly do more than touch lightly on a few of them. I will
comment on four of Galbraith's themes: (1) the behavior of the technostructure, (2) the decline of the "capitalists," (3) the role of the
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market and the antitrust laws, and (4) the relations between the
corporation and the state.
A.

The Behavior of the Technostructure
Galbraith's technostructure strikes me as a sound and useful con-

cept. His analysis of corporate behavior and motivations has a ring of
reality which the more conventional economic analysis generally lacks.
Two qualifications may be noted: first, I suspect that Galbraith slights
the economic aspects of both corporate and individual motivations.
Second, his case for group decision-making is probably overstated.
Corporate Goals and Motivations. Galbraith's analysis of corporate
goals and motivations rightly stresses the pre-eminence of increased
growth among corporate goals. However, the interest of the technostructure in profits is considerably greater than Galbraith suggests.
The argument that interest in profits has lessened because the technostructure receives only an insignificant fraction of the dividends paid
out misses an important point.
When measured as a percentage of total shares outstanding, the stock
ownership interest of the technostructure is generally insignificant.
However, when measured as a percentage of the personal savings of
the individuals in the technostructure, stock of their company is likely
to be a very substantial factor. This has been the natural result of stock
options, stock savings plans, and other compensation and benefit plans
utilizing the corporation's stock. 4
One need not be an economist to hazard the guess that a technostructure whose members have a large part of their personal savings in the
stock of their company will be quite interested in raising the price of
its stock. This is likely to translate itself into a sensitivity to corporate
earnings, when it is recognized that the stock market is acutely sensitive to changes in corporate earnings. The market price of a typical
blue chip stock will reflect a "price-earnings multiplier" of twenty or
even more. The net effect is likely to be a somewhat greater interest in
"maximizing profits" than Galbraith assumes.
Individual Motivations. Galbraith's analysis of the individual motivations of the members of the technostructure concludes that noneconomic motives have become of far greater importance than purely
economic ones. As the most important motives he cites "identification,"
the ability of an individual to identify himself with the objectives of
4 It may be noted that the stock option and incentive compensation plans utilizing
stock are not confined to the top management. In many corporations they apply to a
sizeable group of managers, and technical and other specialists. This supports Galbraith's
conclusions regarding the size and importance of the technostructure.
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the corporation, and "adaptation," the ability of the individual to
obtain satisfaction by shaping and influencing the actions of the corporation.5
While Galbraith is right in stressing the importance of psychological
motivations, two observations may be relevant: First, the role of economic motivation continues to be very high, even with those who are
already well compensated. Any corporate lawyer who has worked on
executive compensation arrangements is likely to have learned that
the acquisitive instincts of modem managers have not been notably
dulled by the satisfactions they obtain from "identification" and
"adaptation." Second, was the traditional model of the "economic
man" ever valid? Is it not likely that businessmen of the nineteenth
century, provided they progressed beyond the level where their daily
needs were satisfied, became involved in the issues and personalities of
their work in much the same manner as the members of today's
technostructure?
Group Decision Making. An important premise of Galbraith's concept of the technostructure is that decisions are made by groups, rather
than by any single individual. This, he argues, is necessary in view of
the complexity of the planning process. No single individual, no
matter how gifted, can combine knowledge of all of the disciplines
necessary for effective decision-making. By carefully combining the
specialized capabilities of a large number of people the corporate
planning process is capable of achieving superior results.
It is difficult to fault Galbraith's conclusions, as a broad generalization. Again, however, some limited qualifications should be noted.
Contrary to popular stereotypes of the "organization man," the more
forceful individuals generally get to the higher levels of the corporate
hierarchy. Such individuals will by the nature of their personalities and
5 Galbraith replaces the traditional hierarchical chart of the corporation, in which the
owners of the corporation are at the top, and power devolves downward, with a conception represented by a series of five concentric circles. In the outermost circle are the
stockholders; in the second, production workers; in the third circle are supervisory,
clerical, and other routine white collar personnel; in the fourth circle are the scientists,
engineers, sales executives, and other specialists; and in the inner circle are the top
executives. Galbraith observes that the motivations change as one moves from the outside
to the inside of this structure. At the outside motivation is purely pecuniary; for example, stockholders will ordinarily sell their stock if a better return can be obtained elsewhere. As one moves inward, first identification and second adaptation take on a progressively more important role.
6 Modern executive compensation arrangements make it difficult to separate economic
from noneconomic elements of motivation. For example compensation plans which make
use of corporate stock obviously reflect and build on what Galbraith calls "identification." Similarly, incentive and bonus plans which reward new ideas and other individual
contributions tend to encourage what Galbraith refers to as "adaptation."
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positions act in a more assertive manner than is implied by group
decision-making. Furthermore, they have an important power over
their subordinates which an economist should not overlook: the power
of the purse.
The role of executive compensation arrangements as an instrument
of motivation and control is very considerable. The higher an individual rises in the corporate structure, the more his compensation
depends on the discretion of his superiors. While at lower levels
compensation takes the form of fixed salary, at higher levels a steadily
increasing share will take the form of bonuses, stock options, and
similar arrangements. These give the senior managers some highly
effective leverage over those reporting to them. Thus, while the picture
of the autocratic captain of industry is clearly out of date, the ascendancy of the committee is far from complete. The reality lies somewhere in between.
Having noted these qualifications, let me reemphasize that Galbraith's analysis of the technostructure, its goals and its decisionmaking process, seems basically sound. Anyone who has observed
corporate affairs at close range is likely to be impressed by his realism.
His analysis provides many useful insights into the operation of one of
our least understood institutions. This is a major contribution, particularly when compared with the mythological character of much of
the writing about American corporations.
B. The Technostructure and the "Capitalists"
Galbraith deals with the shift in power from the owners of capital
to the technostructure at some length. While the point itself is hardly
new, Galbraith's analysis is quite intriguing. He observes that throughout history power has been associated with the factor of production
which is hardest to obtain or replace. Until the nineteenth century
land was the critical factor. Agriculture was the dominant economic
activity, and power in society was clearly in the hands of the land
owners. The nineteenth century, however, saw a shift of power from
land ownership to control of capital. The economic theory of that
century, beginning with Marx, reflects the central power position of
the "capitalists."
In Galbraith's industrial system the most crucial factors of production are the management and technical skills which are combined in
the technostructure. It is these skills which are hardest to obtain or
replace. Adequate capital, on the other hand, is generally available
either through retained earnings or from the enormous supply of
savings which our society is accumulating in such forms as pension
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funds, insurance, and mutual funds. This has resulted in a shift of
power similar to that from land to capital in the nineteenth century.
Galbraith points out that this shift is reflected in "[a] dozen matters of
commonplace observation-the loss of power by stockholders in the
modern corporation, the impregnable position of the successful corporate management, the dwindling social magnetism of the banker, the
air of quaintness that attaches to the suggestion that the United States
is run from Wall Street, the increasingly energetic search for industrial
talent, the new prestige of educational talent and educators ....
Adolf Berle and others have deplored the loss of control of corporate
stock owners and regard it as something of a perversion of the corporate system. Galbraith treats the change as an inevitable consequence
of the modem industrial system. He notes that the stockholder who is
not an active participant in the work of the corporation simply is not
in a position to take a meaningful part in the decision-making process.
Galbraith's analysis provides an answer to those who for reasons of
nostalgia or politics cannot give up the notion that the hidden hand
of Wall Street still pulls the strings. Variously, interlocking directorates
and the control of mutual funds or pension trusts are cited as possible
techniques through which Wall Street still exercises its control. Galbraith's analysis undermines such speculation. In a society where there
are enormous supplies of savings, those who manage the sources of
capital simply do not have the leverage to exercise extensive power.
Experience with corporate financing transactions bears out Galbraith's
analysis. Anyone who has worked on the bond issues of large corporations will find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that he is witnessing
one of the more impressive triumphs of form over substance.
There has of course been a very sharp increase in corporate debt
financing during the past two years. This has resulted in considerably
higher interest rates. However, it does not appear to have had any
appreciable effect on the power position of the suppliers of capital.
At the higher interest rates adequate funds appear to be available. In
the unlikely event that a shortage of capital should develop, and corporations could borrow money only on terms which give the lender a
real voice in the business, I suspect that Galbraith is right in assuming
that most corporations would sooner curtail their expansion plans
than give up their autonomy.
C. The Technostructure, the Market and the Antitrust Laws
It is appropriate to consider together a number of Galbraith's ideas
in the general area of the relation between the industrial system and
7 P. 58.
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its markets. This will include his concept of the management of
demand, and his views about the antitrust laws.
The Management of Demand. Galbraith makes much of the power
of the corporation to "manage the demand" for its products. The
principal tool for this purpose is advertising. Galbraith is almost
certainly correct in stressing the important role which advertising plays
in the economy. One of his major premises is the importance to the
industrial system of steadily increasing production of goods and
services. Increasing production must, of course, be accompanied by
increasing consumption. Galbraith regards all-pervasive advertising
as the necessary tool to assure that consumption will keep up with
production. This appraisal of the role of advertising seems much
sounder than the view of more traditional economists, who denigrate
the importance of advertising and criticize it as an economically wasteful activity.
However, Gailbraith's concept of "management of demand" assumes a degree of control which simply does not exist. Advertising
is a very crude tool which, when successful, will have a favorable effect
on demand. However, its success is not predictable. There can be no
assurance that more advertising will sell more goods. Any corporation
which experienced the sudden and dramatic fall-off in demand for
consumer appliances during the last quarter of 1966 will look with
some incredulity at Galbraith's observations regarding the power to
''manage demand."
It is true of course that corporate planning would be improved if
demand could be managed. Marketing managers would no doubt be
delighted to exercise such power. However, there is an enormous gap
between the desire and its realization. The concerns which Galbraith
expresses in his final chapters about some of the implications of the
management of demand can be postponed until we have reached that
distant and dubious millenium when psychology has become an exact
science. For the present, the corporation must continue to live in a
highly unpredictable world, where even the best laid marketing plans
will often go awry.
The Antitrust Laws. As already noted, Galbraith assumes that the
industrial system has control over the prices at which it sells. Galbraith dismisses the antitrust laws as an anachronism, which prevents
the weak from getting stronger, without affecting those who already
possess market power:
The law is very severe on any overt collusion in the setting
of prices. Such collusion simplifies the task of the oligopolists
in seeking to arrive at the most advantageous price for all.
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And the government scruitinizes closely mergers which
might have the effect of increasing the market power of the
individual oligopolist. The most important effect is to deny
market power to those who do not have it or have difficulty
in exercising it while according immunity to those who
8
already have such power.
Galbraith is out of sympathy with the objectives of the antitrust
laws. The suppression of price competition is regarded as a requirement of a complex industrial system. He believes that the comprehensive planning, which is necessary for the application of intricate
and expensive technology, would be disrupted by severe price competition.
Most importantly, he is not concerned about the dangers of
monopoly. In his view, the modern corporation simply does not behave like the old-fashioned monopolist is supposed to behave. It is
not interested in the classical objectives of curtailing production and
raising prices. Instead of suppressing innovations, the modem corporation is vitally interested in technical change. This paradox is
explained by the fact that the modem corporation is run by its
technostructure. As already noted, the technostructure's prime objective is growth. With expanding production it must keep prices
low enough to attract new customers. Similarly, technical progress is
one of its major goals. Thus, in Galbraith's view, the assumptions
concerning corporate behavior made by the antitrust laws reflect outdated assumptions concerning the corporate power structure. While
they may have been correct when the "capitalists" called the shots,
they are inconsistent with the behavior of a corporation run by its
technostructure.
One reason for the difficulty of antitrust prosecution is that the
large corporation acts in a manner consistent with widely accepted
social goals:
[P]rice control by the mature corporations is combined
not with inefficient performance as the traditional theory
prescribes but with generally favorable performance. ...
[This is] why this control enjoys immunity under law. The
law is helpless in applying penalties to what is socially acceptable.9
Galbraith also dissents from the traditional concern regarding the
evils of bigness. He notes that "nothing so characterizes the industrial
8 P. 186.
9 Pp. 189-90.
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system as the scale of the modem corporate enterprise."1 0 He dismisses the concern about bigness by observing: "that the largest and
most famous corporations, those whose names are household words,
. . . should be considered abnormal must seem a little dubious.""
Galbraith maintains that large size is "the most obvious requirement
of effective planning."' 2 He treats as irrelevant the old dispute whether
the size of the corporation is required by the economies of modem
large scale production or whether large size reflects a desire to monopolize:
The size of General Motors is in the service not of
monopoly or the economies of scale but of planning. And for
this planning-control of supply, control of demand, provision of capital, minimization of risk-there is no clear
upper limit to the desirable size. It could be that the bigger
the better. The corporate form accommodates to this need.
Quite clearly it allows the firm to be very, very large.' 3
In Galbraith's view, one of the principal effects of the antitrust
laws is to obscure the existence of market power. In one bit of flowery
(or rather leafy) prose, he states: "The fig leaf by which power is
kept out of sight is held in place not only by economists but by the
statutes of the United States and the decisions of its courts."' 4
He is not overly concerned about the future of the antitrust laws:
After much discussion, the laws will one day be accommodated formally to the reality. In the meantime, the convention by which they exist but are not enforced is by no
means intolerable-'
Galbraith's views on antitrust are perhaps the most controversial
part of The New Industrial State. While he scores some telling points,
he is also guilty of some wild misses. The economic theories underlying the antitrust laws can certainly benefit from rethinking. Galbraith's lively blasts may well result in some useful ventilation of
ideas. His views on bigness are more realistic than those of the traditional economists, both in terms of economic analysis and in terms of
political implications. He is correct in observing that even the largest
corporations do not behave in accordance with the predictions of the
10 P. 74.
11 P. 73.

12 P. 74.
13 Pp. 76-77.
14 P. 187.

15 P. 197.
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classical model. Galbraith's explanation of their behavior appears quite
convincing.
In other areas of his antitrust analysis, however, Galbraith seems
to be succumbing to the seductions of the systematizer: he prefers to
follow the orderly logic of his system rather than the disorderly facts
of the economic world. Galbraith's discussion of the management of
prices provides an illustration. An orderly planning process would
clearly benefit if prices could be managed. However, with rare exceptions, corporations are not as omnipotent as Galbraith assumes. While
most may regard price competition with the abhorrence which
Galbraith assumes, they may nonetheless have to accept it as unavoidable. Galbraith is quite right in observing that severe price competition disrupts the comprehensive planning which is necessary for the
application of complex technology. Nonetheless, it is true that there
has been very severe price competition in the sale of nuclear power
plants. This is so even though nuclear power is a field involving highly
complex technology, very long lead times from the beginning of a
project to its completion, and very large financial risks. In other
words, all the factors which make comprehensive planning desirable.
While Galbraith's view of the industrial system is more realistic
than that of traditional economists, it is rather neater than the real
world. Corporate behavior simply is not as "planned" as he assumes.
It is true that the modem corporation has enormous resources at its
disposal, and that its ability to overcome technical, marketing and
other problems is often impressive. Nonetheless the range of uncertainties which affects most corporate decisions is far greater than
Galbraith's analysis would lead one to expect. While the importance
of long-range planning is constantly recited in the corporate liturgy,
the differences between preaching and practice are great. Immediate
pressures are invariaby more pressing than the long term interest.
For example, the long term importance of price stability is quite as
important to the corporation as Galbraith assumes. Nonetheless, the
long term interest in stabilizing prices is all too often overcome by
the immediate pressure to unload last month's inventory.1"
The notion that large corporations can regard themselves as immune from the antitrust laws, like the concept of "management of
16 Galbraith's analysis of the technostructure provides at least a partial explanation
for this phenomenon. In the technostructure a great deal of decision-making authority
has been decentralized and is exercised at relatively low levels in the organization. At
these levels, the immediate pressures are obviously far more acute than long-range concerns. In addition, executive "measurement" and compensation arrangements have an
inevitable tendency to accentuate the short term. Short term results are far easier to
measure than long-term changes.
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demand" is something that businessmen may dream about, but will
not recognize as part of their real world. The threat of dismemberment is probably not very real. However, particularly in the area of
mergers, the antitrust laws are more like a chastity belt than like
Galbraith's fig leaf. The reason why many recent attacks on mergers
under Section 7 of the Clayton Act have been directed against smaller
companies is not, as Galbraith suggests, because the antitrust laws
are enforced more harshly against the weak. The real explanation
may well be that the prohibition against acquisition of competitors
by companies with substantial market power is so unambiguous that
few large corporations attempt to make such acquisitions. Similarly,
the reason why conglomerate mergers have become so popular is probably not because businessmen really prefer "mixed marriages," but
because the antitrust laws effectively bar the acquisition of competitors.
Perhaps the most fundamental question raised by Galbraith's attack
on the antitrust laws relates to their underlying values. Even with
due allowances for a lawyer's professional parochialism, I find it very
hard to question the fundamental soundness of the antitrust laws. It
seems to me that the antitrust laws are necessary from both an economic
and political standpoint. I strongly suspect that an economy without
antitrust laws would be quite different from our present industrial
system. It seems inevitable that there would be an enormous increase
in economic concentration. Absent the antitrust laws, what is there
to keep corporations from acting upon the temptation to buy up
their competitors? Furthermore, in the absence of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, it seems inevitable that there would be comprehensive
price fixing, division of markets, and other forms of cartelization.
It is possible that, consistent with his emphasis on the importance
of efficient planning, Professor Galbraith would accept much greater
economic concentration, as well as comprehensive price fixing and
market regulation. However, I question whether the American political system would accept it. The aggregation of economic power would
become so great that its exercise by private organizations might not
long survive. Corporate decision making would almost certainly be
subjected to government supervision and control. Furthermore, even
if such increased concentration would be politically acceptable, I
question whether it would be economically desirable. One of the
healthiest aspects of our economic system lies in its diversity of
decision making. The practical effect of the antitrust laws has been
to preserve a system where there are a number of large companies in
each industry. The increased concentration which would result in the
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absence of the antitrust laws would clearly impair the benefits of
diversified decision making.
Finally, there are real questions regarding manageability. In a
passage quoted previously Galbraith suggests that, in terms of the
efficiency of the planning process, "there is no clear upper limit to
the desirable size; it could be that the bigger the better."'1 This is a
very questionable notion. While corporate experience has shown that
we can manage very large units, it has also shown that increasing size,
coupled with increased complexity, raises major problems of manageability. The burden of proof that substantially larger enterprises can
be managed has not yet been discharged.
In sum, the present industrial system, in which very large size is
permitted but several independent units remain in each industry,
may well represent an optimum balance. Whatever theoretical economic goals the antitrust laws may have been designed to serve, it
seems hard to dispute that they have been a very major factor in the
parallelogram of economic, political and social forces which has produced the present system. It would be useful of course to bring the
theories and the rhetoric of antitrust laws into line with present day
realities. However, it seems unwise to tinker with their fundamentals.
D. The Industrial System and the State
One of Galbraith's principal themes is the erosion of the distinction
between the industrial system and the state:
The industrial system, in fact, is inextricably associated
with the state. In notable respects the mature corporation is
an arm of the state. And the state, in important matters, is
an instrument of the industrial system. This runs strongly
counter to the accepted doctrine. That assumes and affirms a
clear line between government and private business enterprise.... In fact, the line between public and private authority in the industrial system is indistinct and in large measure
imaginary, and the abhorrent association of public and
private organizations is normal.' 8
The theme is further developed in the final chapters of The New
Industrial State where Galbraith speculates about the future:
Given the deep dependence of the industrial system on the
state and the nature of its motivational relationship to the
state, i.e., its identification with public goals and the adapta17 See note 13 supra.
18 Pp. 296-97.
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tion of these to its needs, the industrial system will not long
be regarded as something apart from government. Rather it
will increasingly be seen as part of a much larger complex
which embraces both the industrial system and the state....
Increasingly it will be recognized that the mature corporation, as it develops, becomes part of the larger administrative
complex associated with the state. In time the line between
the two will disappear. 19
I doubt whether Galbraith's observations are correct as an interpretation of current facts, and I seriously question their soundness from
the standpoint of public policy. The accuracy of the analysis and the
desirability of the policy must obviously be dealt with separately.
Galbraith's analysis stresses the importance of federal defense and
space expenditures to the industrial system. He argues that such
expenditures are important both for the management of the aggregate
demand of the whole economy and for underwriting the research
and development costs of the industrial system. The experience of the
past year would suggest that the defense budget, far from being a tool
for the management of the economy, has been its most seriously
unsettling influence. In addition, the value of government-funded
research and development for other industrial applications is far from
clear. The largest part of government research and development expenditures are for defense and space programs. Much of these expenditures are in areas of technology which are so esoteric that their
application for industrial uses, within any period which is of interest
from a business standpoint, is highly unlikely. Few corporations have
been able to move from a position in defense technology into commercial business.
Galbraith's observation that government contracts represent one
of the most attractive markets for the industrial system is not likely
to be accepted by most businessmen. 20 Defense business is generally
regarded as involving great uncertainties which are not, in any practical way, manageable by the corporation. In addition, it brings low
profits and relatively little carryover in technology or even in management skills to other corporate activities.
Galbraith's assertion that government contracts provide a base for
industrial planning is of very doubtful validity. The difference in the
19 Pp. 392-93.
20 It is of course important to distinguish between the small number of large corpo-

rations whose business is preponderantly government oriented, and the much larger
number of corporations which do only a small share of their business with the government.
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management disciplines required for governmental contract activities
and those of commercial businesses cannot be overestimated. Corporations which are active in both government and commercial work have
repeatedly discovered that managers who were successful in defense
businesses had great difficulty in making a transition into commercial
businesses.
The related argument that the cold war supports the planning of
the industrial system is almost certainly wrong. Government contract
activities are invariably run separate and distinct from the commercial
activities of a corporation. Anyone who has dealt with government
auditors knows that a corporation cannot charge against government
contracts corporate planning or other overhead costs which are not
directly related to the contract work.
Galbraith's argument about the influence of the industrial system
on the state draws heavily on examples related to defense procurement. The fact that the Defense Department, in drawing specifications
for a new weapons system, will work closely with prospective contractors, and that in this process of consultation modifications of the
specifications of the weapons systems will be made, hardly proves Galbraith's contention that defense contractors have a significant influence
on defense policy.
Such relationships between the Defense Department and its suppliers are not radically different from those between purchasers and
suppliers of custom designed industrial equipment in a purely commercial field. For example, a steel company which wishes to purchase
an electronic control system will work very closely with its prospective
suppliers before determining the characteristics of the system it will
purchase. The control system manufacturer may well convince the
steel company to add or delete a particular feature of the system.
However, it would seem unrealistic to use such an example as a basis
for drawing far reaching conclusions regarding the influence of electronics manufacturers on the steel industry.
Galbraith's observations regarding the erosion of the line between
government and industry are not consistent with my own observations
of government-industry relationships. It is obviously difficult to generalize about such a large subject. However, my experience suggests
that the line between the government and the corporation becomes
more sharply drawn, the more closely related the subject matter of
a contract will be to private commercial interests. Where a corporation is working on a government directed project which has no commercial application, the relationship is generally quite relaxed. On a
government program with some commercial potential the relationship
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is likely to become more sensitive. Finally, when the government provides support for a privately directed activity the strains are often
very sharp. Particularly in the third category, there is likely to be
acute sensitivity on the part of government personnel that private
industry may "take advantage" of the government. Differences in
the relationship are probably explained better by psychological than
by ideological factors. They are nonetheless quite important to an
analysis of government-industry relations.
Finally, it is worth noting that legal formalities, regardless how
artificial they might appear, can have enormous practical consequences. Separate corporate identity is a case in point. From the
economic standpoint, it may look like a highly artificial exercise.
Much of the formal procedure of corporation law can be criticized as
outmoded or irrelevant. Nonetheless, the law makes the corporation
a separate entity, with broad powers, flexible organization and a
smoothly functioning process of succession to the leadership. That corporations are extremely viable institutions is beyond argument. That
such institutions would readily submerge their identity and "become
part of the larger administrative complex associated with the state"
seems doubtful.
Apart from the accuracy of Galbraith's analysis there is the underlying policy issue: would the erosion of the line between the corporation and the state be desirable? I believe that a key feature of the
present industrial system is that it decentralizes decision-making
power. Galbraith's dichotomy between economic activity which is
subject to "planning" 21 and economic activity which is subject to
"the market" ignores a most crucial point: whether planning is performed by a single agency or by a large number of relatively independent units.
As Galbraith rightly points out, the decision-making process for
any complex economic activity will operate effectively only if the
decision-making group has real autonomy. In view of the enormous
variety and complexity of the industrial system as a whole, its decentralization into separate units seems essential. The mere fact that a
number of separate units are in a position to follow a different course
of action makes it more likely that one of them will, through a com21 Galbraith's use of the term "planning" is an unsatisfactory usage in an otherwise
superlatively well-written book. He makes a sharp distinction between economic activity
which involves "planning" and economic activity which is subject to the market. This
dichotomy seems quite unreal. Economic activity is subject to infinitely varying combinations between market pressures and internally "planned" decisions. The observation
that American corporations engage in a great deal of "planning" provides a highly
tenuous basis for Galbraith's analogies to the "planned" economies of Eastern Europe.
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bination of skill and luck, decide upon the most successful course of
action. My underlying premise is that decisions will generally have
to be made at a time when there will be significant uncertainty about
the right answer. Consequently, the planning effort, no matter how
comprehensive, will not necessarily provide the right answer.
The development of atomic power for the generation of electricity
provides a useful illustration. In the mid-fifties major technical decisions had to be made with respect to the reactor types to be developed. There were many competing systems, each with highly articulate
advocates, both in the scientific and in the industrial community. In
Britain a centralized decision was made by the Atomic Energy
Authority. Here private corporations and the U.S. Atomic Energy
Commission each made independent decisions. At the time the decisions were made no one could be sure of the correct answer. Now,
with the benefit of a dozen years of hindsight it seems quite clear that
the British made the wrong choice. The technology which has
achieved the widest acceptance was selected by two private corporations in the United States. They received substantial assistance from
the AEC. However, they picked a technology which the AEC for some
time did not consider to be the most promising. It is possible that if
the American decision-making process had been as centralized as the
British, the right technology might not have been chosen.
An additional argument can be made for maintaining the independent identity of the corporation, and keeping it from becoming
"part of the larger administrative complex of the state." 22 Galbraith
correctly stresses the importance of the autonomy of the decisionmaking process in any area involving substantial complexity. I suspect
that the necessary autonomy is much easier to achieve in a corporate
setting than within a governmental framework. Such factors as the
annual appropriation process, the role of influential Congressional
committees, the political appointment of senior government officials
and their high turnover rate, are likely to make the necessary auton23
omy much harder to achieve within a government setting.
A major strength of the corporate form has been its great flexibility.
The ability of a corporation to organize its work with maximum
effectiveness for any particular application is substantially greater than
22 P. 393.
23 Galbraith observes that the British Parliament has granted effective autonomy to
the public authorities which manage certain nationalized industries. The U.S. Congress
has traditionally been most reluctant to free public agencies from public accountability.
It seems questionable whether, under our political system, substantial autonomy would
be given to such activities, unless they can be turned over to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
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that of a government agency. The lack of civil service rules and the
ability to frame compensation arrangements without arbitrary ceilings
and with much more flexible features gives the corporation very great
24
advantages.
For these reasons I seriously question the soundness as matter of
public policy of the disappearance of the line between the state and
the corporation. Galbraith is correct in arguing that there should be
no sharp distinction between "private" purposes and "public" purposes. Corporations perform a wide variety of activities falling into
the so-called public sector, both independently and as government
contractors. The expanding entry of corporations into the educational
field provides one recent example. However, from the standpoint of
institutional identity the separation between the state and the corporation must continue. The vastly increasing complexity of economic
life makes this essential.
CONCLUSION

What impact is The New Industrial State likely to achieve? Some
predictions can be made with considerable assurance. Galbraith's
reputation assures that the book will be widely read. His lucid style
assures a high degree of comprehension. The reception will be highly
controversial in all parts of the political and economic spectrum.
It is hard to think of a book which offends so many people in so
many places. Galbraith deflates the egos of union leaders and investment bankers. He attacks the liberals' traditional belief in the antitrust laws, and defaces the conservatives' image of capitalism. The
relish with which he harpoons his fellow economists is bound to affect
the reaction of his professional colleagues. Even though much of his
argument represents an effective defense of the role of the large
corporation, Galbraith slaughters far too many sacred cows to please
the business world. The amiable digression in which he demolishes
the most fundamental premises of public ownership and socialism
will chill the reception from the left.
24 The widespread use of private contracts by the U.S. Government is due not merely
to ideological predilections, but to the inability to overcome the rigidities of bureaucratic organization. The organization of the RAND Corporation provides a good illustration. The Air Force recognized that it could not attract and retain top flight talent in
various specialized fields necessary for its planning. It was very simple to solve this problem by contracting with a private organization which hired the necessary people at
prevailing salary levels for the skills involved. The alternative was realistically unthinkable; it would have been necessary to convince the Civil Service Commission, the Budget
Bureau, and assorted Congressional committees to approve the establishment within the
Department of the Air Force of a large number of positions with salary levels substantially above that of the Secretary of the Air Force.
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After the radiation dies down and the tempers cool, I suspect there
will be a growing acceptance of many of Galbraith's ideas. The concept of the technostructure may well become as familiar as Galbraith's
prior contributions to our vocabulary: the affluent society and the
concept of countervailing power. This should lead to a much better
understanding of corporate behavior.
The antitrust laws, I believe, have more life than Galbraith assumes.
However, The New Industrial State may well pave the way for much
greater realism in the underlying economic theories. For other areas
such as corporation law and government-industry relations, The New
Industrial State provides better insights than -solutions. These insights
are likely to influence future thinking with effects which cannot yet
be assessed.
Meanwhile, Professor Galbraith and his more detached readers will
have had a most enjoyable time.

